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Global Financial Crisis 2007–09

Global Financial Crisis (2007-09) / 2007-2009 / United States of America, Europe / Credit, Liquidity, Financial Crisis

Sources for figures and data

A list of where the figures and numbers in the diagrams and text come from. Click the heading to open.

Read moreNumerical Ledger (33 items)
Just under 600 billiondollarsPeak balance of swap linesDecember 2008 (2 months after the cap was removed)・Nominal. Value read from a graph in a BIS paperBIS 2020 p.7 Graph 1・p.37
Just under 13 trilliondollarsEurodollar liabilities2008・NominalBIS 2020 p.39
0–0.25%%Federal Funds rate target2008-12-16Federal Open Market Committee 2008 Statement
0.0% → 3.9% → 27.2% (peak near 50%)%Repo haircut index (equal-weighted average of 9 types, excluding government bonds)First half 2007 → Second half 2007 → 2008 average・Denominator: value of collateral. Average for the period shown in the paper's table. Monthly movements are depicted in Figure 4 of the paper.Gary B. Gorton, Andrew Metrick 2009 Table I Panel D/E・Introduction p.5
380.31 → 308.14 (−19.0%)Index (1980Q1=100)FHFA House Price Index (All-Transactions)Q1 2007 → Q2 2012・Nominal. Index from both purchase and refinance transactions. Nominal, not seasonally adjusted.U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency USA quarterly values (CSV obtained on 2026-10-23)
Nearly 22 trillion (traditional banks approx. 14 trillion)dollarsShadow banking liabilities (gross)June 2007・Nominal. Aggregation of Flow of Funds Accounts. Contracted by 5 trillion dollars after the peak.Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, Hayley Boesky 2012 Fig. 1 pp.7–8
Total assets $62.4 billion, Lehman CP $785 million (1.2%)dollarsReserve Primary Fund2008-09-15・Denominator: Total assets・Market value. $785 million matches SEC announcement.Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, pp. 356–357
Up to $85 billion (24 months, LIBOR + 850bp, 79.9% equity stake)dollarsCredit line for AIG2008-09-16・Nominal. Government involvement later exceeded $180 billion (FCIC conclusion).Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008 Announcement
$250 → $350 → $700 billion (outstanding balance limit)dollarsTARP purchase authority2008-10-03・Nominal110th Congress of the United States 2008 Section 115
Up to $50 billion (ESF), 1 yeardollarsMMF guarantee program2008-09-19・NominalU.S. Department of the Treasury 2008 Announcement
40 to 1 (one measure)timesLeverage of the five largest investment banks2007・Denominator: Capital・Book value. Bear Stearns had capital of $11.8 billion, liabilities of $383.6 billion, and overnight repos of $70 billion (end of 2007).Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Conclusion, p. xix
5.0% → 9.5% → 10.0%%Unemployment rate2007-12 → 2009-06 → 2009-10・Denominator: Labor force 16 years and over・Seasonally adjustedU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
3.6 million (2008) + 4.7 million (through Dec. 2009)peopleJob losses2008–2009Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 21, p. 390
882,848 million dollars (approx. 882.8 billion dollars)dollarsTotal assets of the Fed (consolidated for all Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday balance)2007-11-28・NominalBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2007 H.4.1 (published 2007-11-29) Consolidated Statement of Condition・Total assets
2,311,893 million dollars (approx. 2.3119 trillion dollars)dollarsTotal assets of the Fed (consolidated for all Federal Reserve Banks, Wednesday balance)2008-12-17・Nominal. The FCIC (Chapter 20, p.371) writes that it increased by 67% to 1.5 trillion dollars by the end of September 2008.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008 H.4.1 (published 2008-12-18) Consolidated Statement of Condition・Total assets
$0.97 (97 cents per share. Redemption requests before 3 PM were $1.00)dollars/shareNet Asset Value (NAV) per share of the Reserve Primary FundSeptember 16, 2008, 4 PM (New York time)・Denominator: 1 share・Lehman bonds (face value $785 million) valued at 0. What fell was the price per share, not the value of the dollar.The Reserve (Reserve Management Company, Inc.; Board of Trustees of The Reserve Fund) 2008 Press release, 2nd paragraph
349 billiondollarsWithdrawals from all prime MMFs (money market funds) — not the amount from the Reserve Primary Fund aloneWithin one week after the Reserve Primary Fund "broke the buck"・Nominal. An additional $85 billion within 3 weeks (ibid. p.357). The FCIC's dissenting view (p.436) states the same $349 billion as "by the middle of the following week".Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 357
$58 billion → $29 billiondollarsHoldings of financial company commercial paper by five large MMFs (the five firms that showed the largest reductions in the FCIC survey)The week after the collapse of Lehman · Nominal. Responses to a survey of large MMFs conducted by the FCIC.Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 358
$150 billiondollarsAmount the Fed lent to banks to buy asset-backed commercial paper from MMFsFirst two weeks after the program's launch on September 19, 2008 · NominalFinancial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 359
$115 billion to 8 of 9 firms (allocation was $125 billion to 9 firms)dollarsCPP capital injection (first settlement)2008-10-28・Nominal. The 9 firms agreed on October 13 (FCIC pp.373–374), CPP announced on October 14.U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008 Capital Purchase Program section
$182.3 billion commitment fully recovered, with a profit of $22.7 billion (Treasury $5 billion, Fed $17.7 billion)dollarsFinal profit and loss on the AIG assistance2012-12-14・Nominal. The final sale of AIG stock was on December 14, 2012 (Treasury announcement TG-1805).U.S. Department of the Treasury Table and text
$443.5 billion disbursed, lifetime cost approx. $31.1 billiondollarsTotal TARP disbursements and lifetime cost2023-09-30 (all programs closed)・Nominal. Recoveries were $425.5 billion (or $443.1 billion including additional income from AIG stock sales of $17.5 billion). Most of the cost was for assistance to avoid home foreclosures. The amount authorized by Congress was $700 billion.U.S. Department of the Treasury Text and Key Facts
−45.7% (January 2009)%Japan's export value year-on-year change (preliminary)2009-01・Denominator: Export value of the same month of the previous year・Nominal・YenMinistry of Finance 2009 Total on page 1
−49.4% (February 2009)%Japan's export value year-on-year change (preliminary)2009-02・Denominator: Export value of the same month of the previous year・Nominal・YenMinistry of Finance 2009 Total on page 1
−33.1% (2009)%Japan's export value year-on-year change (preliminary)2009・Denominator: Export value of the previous year・Nominal・YenMinistry of Finance 2009 Total on page 1
−12.7%%Japan's real GDP (Q4 2008, quarter-on-quarter annualized rate) — First preliminary reportPublished 2009-02-16・Denominator: Previous quarter・Real・Seasonally adjustedCabinet Office, Economic and Social Research Institute, Department of National Accounts 2008 Table of real, seasonally adjusted, quarter-on-quarter annualized rates
−9.2%%Japan's real GDP (Q4 2008, quarter-on-quarter annualized rate) — latest seriesPublished 2026-09-08 (Q2 2026, second preliminary report). Denominator: previous quarter. Real, seasonally adjusted values. Chained prices, calendar year 2020. The value for the same period can differ depending on the publication release.Cabinet Office, Economic and Social Research Institute, Department of National Accounts 2026 CSV of real, seasonally adjusted, quarter-on-quarter annualized rates
1,415 cases, approx. 85,000 people (85,012), of which 57,300 were dispatched workers (57,300 people, 67.4%)peopleTermination of non-regular workers' contracts, etc. (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, December report)As of December 19, 2008 (period covered: October 2008 to March 2009). Denominator: number of people identified. Voluntary survey. Does not include all job separations.Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Employment Security Bureau 2008 Text of the press release
4,127 business establishments, 238,752 people, of which 141,619 were dispatched workers (141,619 people, 59.3%)peopleTermination of non-regular workers' contracts, etc. (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, September report)As of September 18, 2009 (period covered: October 2008 to December 2009). Denominator: number of people identified. Voluntary survey. Does not include all job separations.Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Employment Security Bureau 2009 Page 1
30% of assets (approx. $100 billion)%Net redemptions from publicly offered institutional prime money market funds (MMFs)March 11–24, 2020. Denominator: fund assets. Nominal. The largest two-week outflow from the same type of funds in September 2008 was approx. 26% of assets (approx. $350 billion).President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 2020 p. 14
Total assets approx. $209 billion, deposits approx. $175.4 billiondollarsTotal assets and deposits of Silicon Valley BankDecember 31, 2022. Nominal. Closed on March 10, 2023.Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2023 Press release
25% of assets convertible to cash in one day, 50% of assets convertible to cash in one week%Minimum liquid assets for MMFs (after 2023 amendments)Effective October 2, 2023. Denominator: total assets. Institutional prime and tax-exempt MMFs will impose a liquidity fee if net redemptions exceed 5% of net assets.U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2023 88 FR 51404 (SUMMARY)
Total $750,000 ($100,000 for the son, $325,000 each for two companies)USDSEC vs. Reserve penalty (as reported)2013 (judge's decision; reported Oct 1, 2013), nominal. The SEC had sought over $130 million. The verdict was in November 2012. Based on news agency reports.Reuters 2013 Article
Read moreSources for the figures in the diagrams
DiagramWhat the figure representsValueDate/PeriodSource and location
Fig. 1Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy. $10.8 billion in redemption requests in the morning.—September 15 (Mon)Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, pp. 356–357
Fig. 1Custodian bank stops assisting with payments—September 15, 10:10 a.m.Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 356
Fig. 1Board of trustees values Lehman bonds at 80 cents on the dollar—September 15Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 357
Fig. 1SEC allegation: Requests exceed $20 billion, nearly half remain unpaid—September 15, around 5 p.m.U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2009 Paragraph 107, p. 31
Fig. 1Another $29 billion in redemption requests—September 15–16Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 357
Fig. 1SEC allegation: Requests approx. $24.6 billion, only the first approx. $10.7 billion paid—September 16 (Tue), 9 a.m.U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2009 § 116, p. 33
Fig. 1One share is $0.99 (as acknowledged by the management company on November 26, 2008, according to the complaint).—September 16, 11 a.m. – 4 p.m.U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2009 § 120, pp. 34–35
Fig. 1The 4 p.m. announcement states that requests received before this time will be paid at $1.00 per share.—September 16, 3 p.m. (cutoff)The Reserve (Reserve Management Company, Inc.; Board of Trustees of The Reserve Fund) 2008 Press release, 2nd paragraph
Fig. 1Lehman bonds valued at zero. Price per share announced at $0.97.—September 16, around 4 p.m.The Reserve (Reserve Management Company, Inc.; Board of Trustees of The Reserve Fund) 2008 Press release, 2nd paragraph (SEC complaint, § 121, p. 35)
Fig. 1The Fed decides to lend up to $85 billion to AIG.—September 16, eveningBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008
Fig. 1The Treasury Department begins guaranteeing MMFs (up to $50 billion for one year), and the Fed begins lending to banks that buy assets from MMFs.—September 19 (Friday)U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008
Fig. 1The fund asks the SEC to halt redemptions.—Four days after the 16thFinancial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 357
Fig. 1$349 billion is withdrawn from prime MMFs (the entire fund category) as a whole. This is not the amount from this single fund.—Within one week of breaking the buckFinancial Crisis Inquiry Commission Chapter 20, p. 357
Fig. 2Diagram without numbers———
Fig. 3Example: Bear Stearns (End of 2007) Capital (own money)$11.8 billionEnd of 2007Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Conclusion p.xix
Fig. 3Example: Bear Stearns (End of 2007) Liabilities (borrowed money)$383.6 billionEnd of 2007Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Conclusion p.xix
Fig. 3Example: Bear Stearns (End of 2007) Amount borrowed overnight (max)$70 billionEnd of 2007Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Conclusion p.xix
Fig. 3Leverage of the five largest investment banks40 to 1 (by one measure)2007Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Conclusion p.xix
Fig. 4Hypothetical value, not actual market average (collateral value, discount percentage (haircut))100・0%/20%——
Fig. 4Repo haircut index (equally weighted average of 9 types, excluding Treasury bonds)0.0%First half of 2007Gary B. Gorton, Andrew Metrick 2009 Table I Panel D/E, Introduction p.5
Fig. 4Repo haircut index (equally weighted average of 9 types, excluding Treasury bonds)3.9%Second half of 2007Gary B. Gorton, Andrew Metrick 2009 Table I Panel D/E, Introduction p.5
Fig. 4Repo haircut index (equally weighted average of 9 types, excluding Treasury bonds)27.2%2008 averageGary B. Gorton, Andrew Metrick 2009 Table I Panel D/E, Introduction p.5
Fig. 5Mortgage delinquencies begin to rise—2007-02Markus K. Brunnermeier 2009
Fig. 5BNP Paribas freezes redemptions for three of its funds; the ECB and the Fed provide liquidity—2007-08-09Markus K. Brunnermeier 2009
Fig. 5Acquisition of Bear Stearns is announced; the Fed opens a lending facility for investment banks as well—2008-03-16Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008
Fig. 5Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are placed under government conservatorship—2008-09-07U.S. Department of the Treasury 2008
Fig. 5Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy—2008-09-15Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Fig. 5A share in the Reserve Primary Fund drops to $0.97. The Fed decides to lend up to $85 billion to AIG.—2008-09-16Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008
Fig. 5The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act is passed (authorizing up to $700 billion to purchase troubled assets).—2008-10-03110th Congress of the United States 2008
Fig. 5The Fed sets its target for the policy rate to a range of 0–0.25%—2008-12-16Federal Open Market Committee 2008
Fig. 5The U.S. economy hits a trough (the contraction lasted 18 months)—2009-06National Bureau of Economic Research, Business Cycle Dating Committee
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)4.4%2007-03U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)5.0%2007-12U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)5.6%2008-06U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)6.1%2008-09U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)7.3%2008-12U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)8.7%2009-03U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)9.5%2009-06U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)10.0%2009-10U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)9.4%2010-06U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 6Unemployment Rate (16 years and over, seasonally adjusted)9.3%2010-12U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics LNS14000000
Fig. 7An MMF share falls to $0.97. Within a week, $349 billion is withdrawn from prime MMFs (a group of funds) as a whole, and the commercial paper market shrinks.—September 16, 2008—
Fig. 7Investment banks have 40 in assets for every 1 in capital. They hold assets with overnight borrowing.—2000-2007—
Fig. 7Unemployment rate reaches 10.0%—October 2009—
Read MoreWhat the Evidence Shows

The historical sources are divided into four groups. First, official documents: the conclusion and relevant chapters of the FCIC Final Report (January 2011, a U.S. government publication), announcements from the Fed, Treasury, SEC, and FDIC, Treasury reports to Congress, the text of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, the SEC's 2023 rules on MMFs, and decisions from the Bank of Japan. Second, official statistics: BLS unemployment rates, NBER business cycle dates, FHFA house price index, the Fed's weekly H.4.1 statistics, Japan's Ministry of Finance trade statistics, Cabinet Office preliminary GDP reports, and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare reports. Third, research: Brunnermeier (2009) was read in its entirety, along with relevant sections of Gorton and Metrick's 2009 draft and staff papers from the New York Fed and BIS. Fourth, dissenting opinions: two minority opinions from the FCIC were read for the introduction and conclusion.

The FCIC majority opinion concludes that the crisis was avoidable, citing failures in regulation and supervision, governance, excessive borrowing and opacity, government unpreparedness, a collapse of ethics, the securitization pipeline, over-the-counter derivatives, and credit rating agencies. The commission's position is that GSEs contributed but were not the primary cause, and that excess liquidity was a precondition but not the cause. In contrast, three commissioners, arguing that any single-cause theory is insufficient and the majority opinion too broad, listed 10 essential causes and attributed the credit bubble to international capital flows and a re-evaluation of risk. Another commissioner posits that government housing policy, which created 27 million high-risk loans, was a necessary condition. On the research side, Brunnermeier premises his argument on low interest rates (due to capital inflows from Asia and Fed interest rate policy) and the shift to an "originate-to-distribute" model. There is no consensus on the true cause, either within the commission or among researchers.

These sources have biases and limitations. The announcements from the Fed and Treasury are documents from the actors themselves, with the reasoning written by those actors. Brunnermeier's paper only covers events up to October 2008. Gorton and Metrick's index uses an average for the period shown in the table. The figures cited by the FCIC regarding ratings (Moody's rating nearly 45,000 mortgage-related securities as AAA from 2000 to 2007, with 83% of the 2006 AAAs later downgraded) are based on the commission's case studies. Because the numbers in the FCIC report's PDF cannot be extracted as text by normal means, they have been read in conjunction with figures from Fed and SEC announcements. The SEC's complaint represents the plaintiff's claims, and the outcome of the lawsuit was reported by news agencies. The original Lehman bankruptcy examiner's report and FOMC minutes are not included in the materials listed here.

How we know — Types of sources

Official Documents

Attribution of Causes

FCIC Majority Opinion

Avoidable. Failures in regulation and supervision, governance, excessive borrowing, government unpreparedness, ethics, securitization, OTC, ratings. GSEs not the primary cause. Excess liquidity a precondition but not the cause.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
FCIC Dissenting Opinion (Hennessey, Holtz-Eakin, Thomas)

Any single-cause theory is insufficient; the majority opinion is too broad. 10 essential causes. The cause of the credit bubble was international capital flows and the re-evaluation of risk; monetary policy may have been an amplifying factor but was not essential.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
FCIC Dissenting Opinion (Wallison)

A necessary condition was that government housing policy created 27 million high-risk loans.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Brunnermeier 2009

Premised on low interest rates (capital inflows and Fed policy) and the shift to "originate-to-distribute." Amplification mechanisms turned losses into a crisis.

Markus K. Brunnermeier 2009

Type of Crisis

Classification of this page

Crisis as primary, mania (housing) as secondary. All four parties assume that the rise in housing prices was unsustainable.

Could Lehman Have Been Saved?

Brunnermeier 2009

Buyers demanded a government guarantee, and the Treasury and the Fed did not provide a guarantee with taxpayer funds.

Markus K. Brunnermeier 2009
FCIC Dissenting Opinion (Hennessey et al.)

Judging by their actions with other failed institutions, they would have taken any available option.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
FCIC Majority Opinion

The inconsistency of bailing out Bear → GSEs → not bailing out Lehman → bailing out AIG increased uncertainty.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Read moreBibliography (51 items)

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