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Japan's Asset Bubble of the 1980s

Japanese asset bubble (1980s) / 1987–1991 / Japan / Mania/Bubble

Sources of figures and data

A list of which sources the figures and text data come from. Click the heading to expand.

Read MoreNumerical ledger (11 items)
38,915yenNikkei Stock Average1989-12-29 (closing price on the last trading day of the year) · Market price. Okina et al. p.399 also gives the same value (38,915). 3.1 times the 12,598 yen at the time of the Plaza Accord (1985-09).Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. 2011 Introduction
14,309 (over -60% from peak)yenDecline of the Nikkei Stock Average1992-08 · Market priceKunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001 p.399
Approx. 4 times the level of 1985-09timesUrban Land Price Index (six major cities)1990-09 (peak) · Denominator 1985-09 = 1 · Nominal. Approx. -80% from peak in 1999.Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001 p.399
1987 +34.4%, 1988 +22.4%, 1989 +13.9%, 1990 +21.5%, 1991 −3.2%, 1992 −14.2%%Land prices: Average year-on-year rate of change (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, table from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism)As of July 1 each year. Denominator: price on July 1 of the previous year. Nominal. Tokyo metropolitan area 1987: +57.5% (commercial land +76.1%), Osaka metropolitan area 1990: +45.7%Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau Table
452%% of nominal GDPCapital gains (stocks + land)Cumulative total 1986-1989 · Denominator: Nominal GDP of each year · Nominal. Losses for 1990-93 were 159%. For land alone: +367% (1986-90) · -107% (1991-93) (p.407 Table 1).Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001 p.399 Fig.4
End of 1985: 4,377 trillion yen (land, etc. 24.3%) → End of 1990: 7,937 trillion yen (31.2%) → End of 1994: 8,044 trillion yen (23.9%)trillion yen · %Gross National Assets and the Share of Land, etc.Year-end · Denominator: Gross National Assets · Nominal. The value of land, etc. is 7,936,547 billion yen × 31.2% = 2,476,203 billion yen (margin of ±4 trillion yen due to share being in 0.1% increments). Base year revised at the end of 1994.Cabinet Office National Accounts (5/5)
Trough Nov 1986 · Peak Feb 1991 · Trough Oct 1993Year-MonthPeaks and Troughs of the Business Cycle11th cycle. Expansion: 51 months · Contraction: 32 months.Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office List
5.0 (1983-10-22) → 4.5 → 4.0 → 3.5 → 3.0 → 2.5 (1987-02-23) → 3.25 (1989-05-31) → 3.75 → 4.25 → 5.25 (1990-03-20) → 6.0 (1990-08-30) → 5.5 (1991-07-01) → … → 0.5 (1995-09-08)%Changes in the official discount rate1983–1995 · Commercial bill discount rate. Consistent with Okina et al. Table 2.7Bank of Japan Table
46.9 trillion yen (approx. 20 trillion yen for the construction industry)yenOutstanding loans to the real estate industry (all banks)End of Dec. 1989, outstanding balance. Three industries (real estate, construction, non-banks) account for about 30% of total loans (view of the Director-General of the Banking Bureau)National Diet Library, Search System for the Minutes of Diet Proceedings 1990 Statement 037
10.7442 trillion (1995-03) → 45.1351 trillion (1998-03) → 88.1982 trillion (2003-03) → 107.2204 trillion yen (2020-03)yenCumulative losses from non-performing loan disposals (all banks, since FY1992)Each March period, nominal. Before March 1995, only city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. Risk management loans peaked at 42.028 trillion yen in March 2002Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Bureau, General Affairs Division, Supervisory Research Office 2020 Table 5
60 trillion yen (12% of nominal GDP) → 70 trillionyenPublic funds frameworkOct. 1998 (Financial Reconstruction Laws) / Denominator: Nominal GDP / Framework: The actual amount injected cannot be confirmed from the sources cited hereKunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001 p. 405, note 9
Read moreSources of the figures
ChartWhat the figure representsValueTime/PeriodSource and location
Figure 1Chart without numbers———
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)2.9%1985-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)7.1%1986-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)34.4%1987-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)22.4%1988-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)13.9%1989-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)21.5%1990-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)-3.2%1991-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)-14.2%1992-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)-12.7%1993-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)-7.1%1994-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)-6.0%1995-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 2Average year-on-year rate of change in land prices (three major metropolitan areas, all uses, as of July 1 each year)-6.5%1996-07-01Land Price Research Division, Land and Water Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Table (Three major metropolitan areas, all uses)
Figure 3Official discount rate raised to 3.25% (1st rate hike)—1989-05-31Bank of Japan
Figure 3Final trading day. Nikkei average closing price: 38,915 yen—1989-12-29Nikkei Inc. 2011
Figure 3Official discount rate 5.25%—1990-03-20Bank of Japan
Figure 3Ministry of Finance Banking Bureau's directive 'On the Control of Land-Related Financing'—1990-03-27National Diet Library, Search System for Minutes of the Diet 1990
Figure 3Official discount rate 6.0%—1990-08-30Bank of Japan
Figure 3Urban Land Price Index for the six major cities peaks—1990-09Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001
Figure 3Cabinet decision on the 'General Principles for Comprehensive Land Policy'—1991-01-25National Diet Library, Search System for Minutes of the Diet 1992
Figure 3Peak—1991-02Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office
Figure 3Lifting of the Total Volume Control—1991-12National Diet Library, Search System for Minutes of Diet Proceedings, 1992
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)1.61993-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)5.51994-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)10.71995-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)24.11996-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)31.91997-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)45.11998-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)58.81999-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)65.72000-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)71.82001-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)81.52002-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)88.22003-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)93.62004-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)96.42005-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)99.02008-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)103.72010-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)105.92015-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 4Cumulative Losses on Disposal of Non-Performing Loans of All Banks (since FY1992)107.22020-03-31Financial Services Agency, Supervisory Coordination Division, Supervisory Bureau 2020 Table 5 "Cumulative total from FY1992 onwards"
Figure 5Plaza Accord. To counter the strong yen and recession, the official discount rate is lowered to 2.5%.—September 1985—
Figure 5Commercial land prices in the Tokyo metropolitan area rise by 76.1% in one year. Lending collateralized by land increases.—July 1987—
Figure 5Nikkei average reaches 38,915 yen. This is the peak.—December 29, 1989—
Figure 5Notice on real estate financing restrictions. Three months after the stock market peak.—March 27, 1990—
Figure 5Disposal of non-performing loans. Cumulative total of 107.2204 trillion yen up to the fiscal year ending March 2020.—From fiscal year ending March 1993—
Read moreWhat this shows

The historical sources are divided into four groups. First, official documents and public statistics. I consulted the Bank of Japan's table of official discount rates, the Cabinet Office's reference dates of business cycles and long-term economic statistics, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism's table of land price fluctuation rates (year-on-year as of July 1 of each year), and the Financial Services Agency's table of losses on disposal of non-performing loans, all on their respective creators' websites. Second, the Diet proceedings. I read the Finance Minister's statement on March 27, 1990, when the directive was issued, the supplementary explanation by the Director-General of the Banking Bureau the next day, the Budget Committee on April 3, and the Finance and Construction Committees on February 26, 1992, after the directive was lifted, and from these, I extracted the content of the directive, the month of its implementation, and the circumstances of its repeal. The original text of the directive itself is not included in the sources cited here. Third, a paper from the Bank of Japan's Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. I read the full text of Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, and Shigenori Shiratsuka (2001) and have relied on it for many of the values and the policy timeline. Fourth, an article by the creator of an index. Only the beginning of a 2011 article from the Nikkei is publicly available.

These sources have biases. The paper by Okina et al. is a reflection by Bank of Japan staff on their own policies, and the chapter on 'Reasons for the Delay in Monetary Tightening' is written from that perspective. The remarks by the Chairman of the Policy Board and the monthly research report from April 1990 are read not in their original form but to the extent they are quoted in the authors' English translation. The Diet proceedings include statements from the Ministry of Finance and the National Land Agency, as well as criticisms from Diet members, but they are not records from the perspective of financial institutions or borrowers. Land price statistics vary by use and city; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism's land price table is as of July 1 (the name of the statistic is not written on the table's page), while the Urban Land Price Index uses values from the end of March and the end of September. The values for the Urban Land Price Index are taken not from the original statistics but from the paper by Okina et al.

Research perspectives differ. Okina et al. argue that there was no single factor, but rather that the proactive behavior of financial institutions, prolonged monetary easing, the land tax system and regulations, weak discipline, and confidence in Japan became intertwined through the 'reinforcement of bullish expectations.' They assess that monetary easing was a necessary but not sufficient condition, and that even with earlier tightening, the bubble's formation could not have been prevented, only its collapse would have been hastened. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) estimated that it could have been prevented if interest rates had been raised from 4% to 8% in 1988. Yoshitomi (1998) attributes the cause to the increase in real estate-related lending and proposes strengthening prudential regulation rather than monetary policy as a countermeasure. For Noguchi (1992), Nikkei Inc. (2000), and Muramatsu and Okuno (2002), only the titles and publication details were confirmed. Different studies have different views on the causes, and it is not possible to determine which is correct.

Okina et al. also compare it to the bubble after World War I. Land capital gains were 335% of GNP from 1913-19, and the loss was 43% from 1924-30. The 367% from 1986-90 and 107% from 1991-93 show a similar rate of increase, but a larger decrease. They write that the rate of stock price fluctuations was unchanged, but the decline in economic activity after the collapse was smaller in the 1980s. I note this here as an example of two events in the same country measured by the same yardstick.

How we know — Types of sources

Official Documents

Causes and Policy Responsibility

Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka 2001

There is no single factor. Easing was a necessary but not sufficient condition. Even with early tightening, the bubble could not have been prevented, and it might have burst earlier, resulting in less damage.

Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001
Bernanke–Gertler 1999 (via Okina et al.)

It could have been prevented by raising interest rates from 4% to 8% in 1988.

Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001
Yoshitomi 1998 (via Okina et al.)

The cause was an increase in real estate-related lending. The response was to strengthen prudential regulations.

Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001
Noguchi 1992

Not referenced in the main text (only title and publication confirmed)

Yukio Noguchi 1992
Nikkei 2000

Not referenced in the main text (only title and publication confirmed)

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. (ed.) 2000

Definition of the Bubble Period

Okina et al.

1987–1990 (simultaneous rise in asset prices, economic activity, money, and credit). Does not adopt a definition based on deviation from equilibrium prices.

Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001

Effect of the Quantitative Restrictions

Ministry of Finance (Banking Bureau Director-General Tsuchida 1992)

The growth of land-related lending was generally brought under control.

National Diet Library, Search System for Minutes of the Diet 1992
Okina et al. 2001

The introduction was almost simultaneous with the collapse of the bubble. When expectations are strong, quantitative restrictions create loopholes.

Kunio Okina, Masaaki Shirakawa, Shigenori Shiratsuka 2001
Criticism in the Diet (Shibuya, Ikeda 1992)

It was too little, too late, and withdrawn before it could achieve results / If only the trigger mechanism had been implemented sooner.

National Diet Library, Search System for Minutes of the Diet 1992
Read moreBibliography (17 items)

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