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Sources of figures and data

Railway Mania

Railway Mania / 1844–1847 / Great Britain / Craze & Bubble

Sources of figures and data

A list of where the figures in the diagrams and text come from in which sources. Click the heading to expand.

Read moreNumerical ledger (10 entries)
63 → 199 → 562billsNumber of applications for railway billsEnd of 1843 → 1844 → 1845. Denominator: Applications to Parliament. Original source not consulted.Gareth Campbell, John D. Turner 2012 p.4, note 11 (via Railway Times)
1,263companiesNumber of new schemes (Spakman's table)1845-11-17. Denominator includes those not reaching the application stage. Consistent with CT note 12 & Odlyzko p.141.D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.21–22
563,203,000 / 59,136,300poundsCapital and required deposit for new schemes (Spakman's table)1845-11-17. Denominator: 1,263 companies. Nominal value. A Times editorial mentions 1,428 lines and £701,243,208.D. Morier Evans 1848 p.22
815 (606, 121, 83)plansPlans submitted to the Board of Trade by November 301845-11-30. Denominator: submissions. Dalhousie says "over 800" (Evans p.41).House of Commons 1846 c.190
1,984 → 1,623 → 673Index (Jan. 1844 = 1,000)Railway Share Index1845-08-08 → End of Nov. 1845 → 1850-04-19・Basis: Author's index・Market value. Decline rate 66.1% (Campbell 2013 p.8)Gareth Campbell, John D. Turner 2012 p.4 Fig.1
2.5 → 3.0 → 3.5 → 3.0 → … → 8.0 → 4.0%Official discount rate1844-09-07 → 1845-10-16 → 11-06 → 1846-08-27 → … → 1847-10-25 → 1848-01-27・Basis: Bank RateBank of England HISTORICAL SINCE 1694
9 million (projected) / 8–10 million / 6–7 millionpoundsPayment of deposits in Jan–Feb 1846Jan 1846. Denominator: Deposits to Parliament, in cash. Three estimates by Members of Parliament are listed. The final settled amount is not found in the sources cited here.House of Commons 1846 cc.371, 374 (H0123 c.131)
1845: 118 acts, over 56 million / 1846: 95.46 millionpoundsAuthorized capital in 1845–461845 / 1846・Basis: Parliamentary authorization・Nominal value. The 1846 figure is cited by Odlyzko from "Return of Railway Acts 1844–47".House of Commons 1846 c.189 (1846 figure from Odlyzko, note 215)
6.15m・1.4m・3.508m・3.2m・5.3m・2.28m・4.16m・3.76m・2.04mpoundsCalls in 1847 (monthly)Jan, Feb, Mar, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov 1847・Basis: British and foreign lines・Amount of calls. April and May are not mentioned.D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
67.5 million → 88.5 million → 167.3 million → 245.8 millionpoundsCumulative invested capital (Odlyzko Table 2)1843 → 1845 → 1847 → 1850. Denominator: British railways. Original statistics not consulted.Andrew Odlyzko 2010 p.34 Table 2
Read moreSources of the figures in the diagrams
DiagramWhat the figure representsValueDate/PeriodSource and location
Fig. 1Diagram without numbers———
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)6.21847-01D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)1.41847-02D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)3.51847-03D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)3.21847-06D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)5.31847-07D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)2.31847-08D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)4.21847-09D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)3.81847-10D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 2Railway calls in 1847 (monthly)2.01847-11D. Morier Evans 1848 pp.54–56, 64–65, 71, 74, 98
Fig. 3Length of railways authorized by Parliament per session911843Andrew Odlyzko 2010 pp.77–78, note 215
Fig. 3Length of railways authorized by Parliament per session8051844Andrew Odlyzko 2010 pp.77–78, note 215
Fig. 3Length of railways authorized by Parliament per session2,7001845Andrew Odlyzko 2010 pp.77–78, note 215
Fig. 3Length of railways authorized by Parliament per session4,5381846Andrew Odlyzko 2010 pp.77–78, note 215
Fig. 3Length of railways authorized by Parliament per session1,3541847Andrew Odlyzko 2010 pp.77–78, note 215
Fig. 3Length of railways authorized by Parliament per session3711848Andrew Odlyzko 2010 pp.77–78, note 215
Fig. 4Bank rate 2.5%—September 7, 1844—
Fig. 4Railway share index peaks at 1,984—August 8, 1845—
Fig. 4Bank rate 3.0%. Panic over the weekend—October 16, 1845—
Fig. 4Government letter. Banks lend at 8%—October 25, 1847—
Fig. 4Index at 673. 6,621 miles of railway in operation—1850—
Read moreWhat the sources tell us

The historical sources are divided into four groups. First, parliamentary records. The House of Commons debates of January 23, 26, and 29, 1846, the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech of November 30, 1847, the Railway Regulation Act of 1844, and the Dissolution of Companies and Railway Commissioners Acts of 1846 were read in their original versions on Hansard and legislation.gov.uk. Second, the official table of the Bank of England's bank rate. Third, contemporary publications: Evans's (1848) *The Commercial Crisis 1847-1848*, Tooke's (1848) *A History of Prices*, Volume 4, and Francis's (1851) *A History of the English Railway*, Volume 2, were read for the sections covering 1845 to 1847. Fourth, academic research: Campbell and Turner (2012) and Campbell (2013) were read in their entirety, while for Odlyzko (2010), the introduction, chronology, conclusion, and tables were read. Mackay's 1852 edition was read as the source of the legends.

Some items are missing. The number and occupations of subscribers are based on Campbell and Turner's count from parliamentary lists; the original lists have not been read. The share price index was created by the authors from daily prices in the Railway Times; their paper was consulted, not the original tables. The table from The Times of 17 November 1845 was read from a transcription by Evans and Odlyzko. Statistics counting the total amount of calls, total losses, and the number of bankruptcies from 1846 to 1848 are not found in the sources cited here.

Research positions are divided. Campbell and Turner conclude from the registers that the majority of capital was provided by experienced investors, and that insider investments did not perform better than others. Campbell observes that even amidst the frenzy, similar assets were priced consistently, and that returns were inflated by the leverage of instalment payments. Odlyzko argues that the market was highly inefficient, seeing a "collective delusion" where investors ignored quantitative indicators showing that demand was insufficient for expected returns. Regarding the Panic of 1847, the Chancellor of the Exchequer cited the absorption of capital into grain and railways as the main cause, Lord Russell downplayed the importance of payment calls, the opposition blamed the 1844 Act and the bank's tightening in April, Tooke assessed that low interest rates from September 1844 had encouraged speculation, and Odlyzko holds that the panic had little effect on railway investment. These five views still coexist today.

Why so many people invested in railway shares that, in hindsight, were a poor deal is also an open question. Campbell and Turner list several candidates without deciding on any one: the lack of outlets for savings as the national debt was not increasing, "riding the bubble" behavior to sell out while prices were rising, the discounting of future profits at a high rate as the probability of adopting the new technology increased, and the political failure of Parliament not to narrow down the schemes in the autumn of 1845.

The sources for the numbers have been standardized. The bank rate is from the Bank of England's table, authorized mileage and cumulative investment are from Odlyzko's table and chronology, monthly calls are from Evans, and the estimate for parliamentary deposits is from the House of Commons debates. Even for the same event, descriptions differ depending on the date of announcement versus the date of effect, such as the 6% bank rate of September 30, 1847 (Bank's table) versus the announcements of September 23 and October 1 (Tooke's list of 13 changes). In the text, the dates from the Bank's table are used, and Tooke's list has been kept in the chronology.

How we know — Type of source

Popular Books

Were the participants amateurs?

Campbell–Turner 2012

Experienced investors provided most of the capital. Clergy and women, 1.2%.

Gareth Campbell, John D. Turner 2012
Odlyzko 2010

Investors, "mostly newcomers to the stock market," were caught in a collective delusion.

Andrew Odlyzko 2010
Satire and contemporary accounts (Thackeray, Francis 1851)

Widows, clergy, servants, the middle class

John Francis 1851

Was the market inefficient?

Odlyzko 2010

Quantitative indicators of demand were ignored. Highly inefficient.

Andrew Odlyzko 2010
Campbell 2013

Similar assets were priced consistently, and returns were inflated by leverage (myopic rationality).

Gareth Campbell 2013

Causes of the 1847 crisis

Chancellor of the Exchequer Wood (1847-11-30)

The absorption of capital into grain and railways acted upon an unsound basis of credit.

House of Commons 1847
Opposition debate (Cayley et al.)

Lord Russell downplays calls. The causes were the 1844 Act and the April credit tightening.

House of Commons 1847
Tooke 1848

The Bank's low interest rates under the 1844 Act encouraged speculation.

Thomas Tooke 1848
Odlyzko 2010

The crisis had little effect on railway investment.

Andrew Odlyzko 2010
Read moreBibliography (15 items)

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