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BIBLIOGRAPHY

One Hundred Year History of the Bank of Japan, Vol. 3, Chapter 5 "Post-war Economic Turmoil and the Search for the Lifting of the Gold Embargo (2. Great Kantō Earthquake and Special Financing, 4. Financial Crisis of 1927)".

One Hundred Year History of the Bank of Japan, Vol. 3 — Editorial Committee for the One Hundred Year History of the Bank of Japan (Bank of Japan).

Claims Supported by This Source

  1. p. 170: According to a report from the Ministry of Finance, around 1:20 PM on March 14, Managing Director Watanabe Rokurō of the Tōkyō Watanabe Bank visited Vice-Minister Tajiri at the Ministry of Finance and reported that the bank was unable to settle its clearing balance deficit of approximately 337,000 yen. The bank later settled the clearing balance around 3:00 PM and suspended operations from the following day.
  2. p. 170: According to Bank of Japan records, the bank settled its clearing balance around 2:00 PM and remained open for business as usual until around 4:00 PM. Due to the widespread circulation of the Minister's statement, it suspended operations from the following day, the 15th.
  3. pp. 172–173, Table 4-1, Table 4-2: 11 banks suspended operations during the first wave of turmoil (March 15–23). Loans from this bank (Bank of Japan) increased 2.8-fold, from 227.97 million yen on the 14th to 630.07 million yen on the 23rd.
  4. p. 174: On the evening of March 26, the Bank of Taiwan notified Suzuki & Co. that it would not be able to extend further loans from the 28th onward. Suzuki & Co. suspended all new transactions on April 5.
  5. p. 176, note 26: At the plenary session of the Privy Council on April 17, the draft emergency imperial ordinance was rejected by a vote of 19 to 11, and the Wakatsuki cabinet resigned en masse.
  6. pp. 178–179, Table 4-3: On April 21 alone, loans from this bank (Bank of Japan) increased by 601.82 million yen. 200-yen notes printed on only one side were issued.
  7. p. 180: Imperial Ordinance No. 96 postponed the payment of private monetary obligations for 21 days, with the exception of payments of bank deposits of 500 yen or less per day. Commercial banks were temporarily closed on the 22nd and 23rd.
  8. p. 181: On May 8, the Special Financing Act and other laws were passed. The government would compensate for losses up to a limit of 500 million yen, and provide loans up to a limit of 200 million yen to financial institutions in Taiwan. The moratorium was lifted on May 13.
  9. p. 217, Table 4-19: 31 banks (excluding the Bank of Taiwan) suspended operations from mid-March to late April. The number of ordinary banks decreased from 1,537 at the end of 1925 to 782 at the end of 1930.
  10. p. 251, Table 4-24: Special financing under the Compensation Act totaled 761.92 million yen to 114 banks.

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